

Government Publishes Cost-Benefit Analysis of EU Membership

At last, a European government has published a proper cost-benefit analysis of EU membership. It comes as no surprise that the government in question is not the one that sits (and occasionally governs) in London. No, the government concerned is a grown-up one (on matters European, anyway): the Swiss Federal Government in Berne.

Its *Europe 2006 Report**, published at the end of June 2006, is an admirably serious and comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of EU membership. It is remarkably honest. Its language is free of political correctness: it spells out bluntly and unequivocally the hundreds of areas in which Switzerland would lose sovereignty – yes, **sovereignty** – if it were ever to join the EU.

The authors insist that “Switzerland must define its...relations with the EU in such a way as to always be able to defend [Swiss] interests..... Switzerland’s relationship with the EU must not be considered as a simplistic ‘to join or not to join’ question...It is not so much a question of whether or not Switzerland should be a member of

the EU, as of finding the best way and the appropriate [policy] instruments for the government to achieve Switzerland’s fundamental goals and foreign policy objectives”. Quite so.

The report examines three alternatives:-

contribution to the EU Budget) are likely in the short and medium term to outweigh any positive effects resulting from full Single Market integration” and that the “budgetary” costs do not reflect the further “dynamic” effects associated with each alternative.

The report concludes that Switzerland’s interests are best served by continuing to develop the existing system of bilateral sector-specific agreements with the EU. It is the mirror-

image of exercises currently being undertaken by those in the UK who wish to defend British interests by radically-changing the current UK-EU relationship.

* www.europa.admin.ch Home page: click on “English”; *Europe 2006 report* “Information file on the Europe 2006 Report (unofficial translation)”. The condensed English version runs to 12 pages; the full report in French is 157 pages and in German 164 pages.

Described in *Global Britain Briefing Note No 36, Nov 2004, Cherry-Picking, www.globalbritain.org*

Annual Cost to Switzerland of alternative relationships with EU: 2007-2013

	Swiss francs millions	Index
Continue Bilateral Agreements	557	100
Join EEA	737	132
Join EU (net contribution)	3,400	610
Join EU (gross contribution)	4,940	886

■ to continue the current set of Swiss-EU bilateral sector-specific agreements#;

■ to join the European Economic Area (EEA)#;

■ to become a full member of the EU

The ongoing budgetary costs to Switzerland of each of the alternatives are summarised in the table. Full EU membership would cost between **SIX** and **NINE TIMES** as much as the current system of Bilateral Agreements, depending on whether the base-line is the net or gross contribution to the EU Budget.

The report warns that “the negative economic effects (higher real domestic interest rates on joining the euro, net

INSIDE: Single currency trap closes on French economy p.2 - UK contribution to Brussels: Big increase in 2005 p.3 - EU takes declining share of UK exports p.4 - More UK jobs dependent on trade outside the EU than with the EU p.5

Single Currency Trap Closes on French Economy

Jobs in manufacturing and services migrate from France to Germany

Germany and France have shared a single currency, a single exchange rate and a single interest rate since 1999. It may or may not be coincidence, but 1999 also marks the beginning of a rather extraordinary divergence in the export performance of the two countries, Germany doing outstandingly well, France doing quite badly.

The German current account balance was substantially negative throughout the 1990s, while the French was substantially positive except in 1990 and 1991. Broadly speaking, in that decade, the German economy imported more than it exported, while the French economy exported more than it imported. Starting in 2000, the reverse has happened.

Germany's current account balance reached equilibrium in 2000 then sprang into surplus, hitting a record 92 billion in 2005, roughly 4 per cent of GDP. France's current account balance peaked in 1999, then slumped, moving into deficit in 2003. In 2005, that deficit hit 27 billion, a lot less than the deficits of the USA (\$805 bn), the UK (\$58 bn) or Spain (\$86 bn) but still an eye-watering figure. As the Banque de France ruefully points out, during the last five years the French current account balance has gone from a surplus equivalent to 3 per cent of GDP in 1999 to a deficit equivalent to 1.6 per cent of GDP in 2005 – a “swing” of almost five percentage points of GDP.

Trade in Goods

The main “drivers” of the German surplus and the French deficit were their contrasting performances in trade in goods. In 2005, German goods exports (the biggest of any country anywhere) exceeded German goods imports by a staggering 160.5 billion. In France in 2005, French goods imports exceeded French goods

exports by 27 billion. Both countries (and indeed most countries) paid more for their imports of energy and raw materials, 4.5 per cent more than in 2004 in the case of Germany, a bit less in the case of France. Both countries' biggest single country deficits were with China.

World trade in 2005 grew in real terms by around 7 per cent (compared with 10 per cent between 2003 and 2004). Germany's strength in manufactured capital goods, which account for 45 per cent by value of all German goods exports, helped Germany to benefit from rising demand for such products, as did German exporters' success in holding steady or even improving their price-competitiveness. Meanwhile, the ongoing weakness in the German domestic economy held down demand for imports, resulting in its rising trade-in-goods surplus.

Overall, Germany slightly increased its market share of global goods exports in 2005. It also increased its market share of eurozone goods exports. Outside the eurozone, export highlights for Germany were increases of 16 per cent to Poland, 16 per cent to OPEC countries and 17.5 per cent to the former Soviet countries.

French goods exporters, on the other hand, again lost market share, both inside the eurozone and at the global level, the value of their goods exports growing significantly slower than the growth in eurozone and world trade-in-goods. For both Germany and France, exports outside the eurozone grew faster than their exports to their “partners” in the single currency. It looks also as if import penetration of the domestic French economy increased.

Trade in Services

Germany remained in deficit on its trade in services in 2005, at 28 billion, though this was a decrease of 3 billion compared with 2004. The

explanation was the large surpluses in transport services, due partly to Germany's growing goods exports which tend to be shipped by German transport companies. Germany also ran a deficit on foreign travel, with German residents' expenditure on travel to destinations outside the eurozone growing faster than on destinations within the eurozone.

France in contrast remained in surplus on its trade in services in 2005, though that surplus has more than halved since the record year of 2000. The balance on travel remained positive, though it has shrunk steadily over the last five years, the bulk of the shrinkage coming from travel within the eurozone.

Income

Germany has moved from a sizeable deficit on its income balance in 2003 to a sizeable surplus in 2005. A similar trend has occurred in France, with the surplus on income almost doubling between 2003 and 2005. In both countries, inward direct investment and outward direct investment surged in 2005, with receipts of income from such investments growing faster than the income paid by foreign-owned companies in Germany and France to their parents outside those countries.

Why the Franco-German divergence, and what does it mean?

Germany and France are two large diversified advanced economies more or less wholeheartedly engaged in the ongoing process of globalisation. An explanation of their diverging export performance is necessarily complex, but the main strands appear to be as follows.

Structural and conjunctural reasons go some way to explaining Germany's stunning export performance. Surging

Continued on P.3

Single Currency Trap

demand in the emerging economies such as China over the last five years for capital goods (machine-tools, compressors, electrical equipment, transport equipment etc etc), has coincided with their ready availability in the country, Germany, which has always been the world leader in this field. French exports, in contrast, have traditionally been more oriented to small and medium-range cars, commodities and luxury goods, and are more vulnerable than Germany's to competition in both the advanced and the emerging economies – and not just in goods. The shrinkage in France's surplus in services, and the contraction of Germany's deficit on services, must be particularly worrying for Paris.

On the face of it, growing German trade surpluses and growing shares of eurozone and global export markets must be being accompanied by increases (or a slowing in the decreases) in German private-sector export-oriented jobs. The reverse would appear to be happening in France, with growing trade deficits and losses in France's shares of eurozone and global export markets resulting in losses (or an absence of job-creation) in French private-sector export-oriented jobs. Such job creation and destruction may be hard to detect at the macro level, given that the bulk of the German and French economies (possibly as much as 75 to 80 per cent) are not involved in exporting at all.

However, it seems plausible that many export-related jobs, especially in manufacturing, but also in services, are in effect migrating from France to Germany, further damaging the uneasy quasi-equilibrium that (in French minds at least) has been the unspoken "deal" at the core of the European project. In time, this will affect the way France views the European Union.

Given that Germany and France are the two biggest members of the eurozone, and that each country is the other's biggest customer and biggest supplier, why should their export performances be diverging so markedly, and what can France do about its own poor showing?

The Bundesbank is very clear that a large part of recent German export success has been due to the country's increasing price-competitiveness in export markets. For Germany, a "strong" euro has been no more of a problem for its price-competitiveness than the strong Deutschmark used to be in the good old days. In countries with their own independent currencies and monetary policies, the exchange rate takes the strain when a country's export prices get out of line. Their currencies depreciate (devalue) and price-competitiveness is automatically and rapidly restored. In a single currency, that safety-valve or shock-absorber is no longer available. The only way out (for the French in this case) is the hard way: for real wages of workers in

export-oriented businesses to be cut. In France, with its byzantine and onerous labour regulations, such an escape route is almost impossible. Realistically, all that France can hope for (short of abandoning the euro) is that German industry will gradually become less price-competitive. That might take an awful long time. For the moment, France is stuck fast in a trap of its own making: the single currency.

This article is based on "German balance of payments in 2005", March 2006 Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, www.bundesbank.de, and "Les grands traits de la balance des paiements et de la position extérieure de la France en 2005", Bulletin de la Banque de France, No 150, Juin 2006. See also Global Britain Briefing Note No 41, May 2006, "Germany Impressive, UK Dismal, France Even Worse", www.globalbritain.org. The European Central Bank, in its July 2006 Monthly Bulletin (www.ecb.int) confirms that, of the five biggest euro economies, only Germany increased its export market share between 1995 and 2005; those of France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands all shrank. Of the seven small euro economies, only Ireland increased its export market share over the same period. eurofacts is also reporting on the definitive British Balance of Payments data up to and including 2005 (contained in The Pink Book 2006, which was published in July 2006).

UK Contribution to Brussels: Big Increase in 2005

According to the UK's official government statistical body, the ONS (Office for National Statistics, an offshoot of the Treasury), the UK's net contribution to EU institutions in 2005 was £6.1 billion, an increase of 20 per cent on the £5.1 billion paid over in 2004.

The UK's gross contribution in 2005 was a record £15.0 billion, up 15 per cent on the 2004 figure of £13.1 bil-

lion. The UK received from "Brussels" £8.9 billion in 2005, an increase of 11 per cent on the 2004 figure of £8.0 billion.

The 2005 rate of payment by the UK to "Brussels", of £15.0 billion gross annually, is equivalent to £289 million per week, or £41 million per day, or £1.72 million per hour.

The figures are set out in Table 9.2 on pages 125, 126 and 127 of *United*

Kingdom Balance of Payments: The Pink Book 2006[#].

[#] United Kingdom Balance of Payments: The Pink Book 2006: *Office for National Statistics, July 2006. Free download: www.statistics.gov.uk > Browse by Theme > Select Theme > Economy > Go > More detailed topics for Economy > Balance of Payments > United Kingdom Balance of Payments: The Pink Book > Pink Book 2006.*

EU Takes Declining Share of UK Exports

UK exports outside the EU are growing over 40 per cent faster than exports to the EU

According to the new Pink Book#, published at the end of July 2006, the EU (that is to say the UK's EU-24 partners) is taking a declining share of the UK's worldwide exports. Table 1 shows the official data. It follows that an increasing proportion of the UK's worldwide exports are going outside the EU. The trend set in 2002 continues.

The UK's export statistics over-state exports going to the EU, and under-state exports going to the world outside the EU. There are two separate reasons for this distortion. The first is the Rotterdam-Antwerp Effect, concerning exports of goods and services (described on page 188 of the new *Pink Book*); the second is the Netherlands Distortion, which affects flows of "Income". When the official figures are corrected to take account of these two distortions, the real share of the UK's worldwide exports absorbed by EU-24 is significantly lower. Absolute precision is impossible, but a plausible estimate for 2005 would be well below 45 per cent, most likely nearer 40 than 45 per

cent*. The corresponding adjusted real proportion of the UK's worldwide exports

going *outside the EU* in 2005 would be somewhere between 55 and 60 per cent, with 60 per cent more likely than 55 per cent.

How is it that the share of UK exports going to the EU is declining?

Quite simply, British exports to the world *outside the EU* are growing faster than British exports *to the EU*. Tables 2 and 3 give key extracts of the data – again, unadjusted for the two distortions described above.

Table 2 shows that over the period 1999 – 2005 British exports to the world outside the EU grew at almost 8 per cent a year, forty-four per cent **faster** than British exports to the EU, which grew at only 5.5 per cent per year. If we look at Continental EU only (i.e. EU-24 less Ireland) the disparities in growth rates become even more striking. British exports to the world (including Ireland) outside Continental EU grew sixty-seven per cent (8.2 divided by 4.9) faster than British exports to Continental EU.

Continued on P.5

Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Share %	52.3	52.3	50.7	49.0	48.0

Goods, Services, Income, Transfers

Source: Page 125, Table 9.2, Pink Book 2006*
* UK Balance of Payments: The Pink Book 2006, www.statistics.gov.uk

Country/Region	Rate of Growth %
To: World outside the EU	7.9
EU-24	5.5
World	6.7
To: World outside Continental EU ³	8.2
Continental EU ³	4.9
To: EFTA ⁴	7.2
Russia	27.7
Turkey	8.8
USA	7.2
Canada	4.2
China + Hong Kong	12.5
India	12.6
Japan	1.0
Singapore	9.0
Gulf Arabian Countries	17.4
Australia + New Zealand	8.1
South Africa	10.2

1: Annual average compounded
2: Exports: value @ current prices of Goods, Services, Income and Transfers
3: "Continental EU": EU-24 Less Ireland
4: EFTA: Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein

Source: Table 9.2, page 125, UK Balance of Payments, The Pink Book 2006 www.statistics.gov.uk

EU's Declining Share of UK Exports

Table 3 shows that, apart from Ireland and Spain, UK exports to its main EU country markets grew at rates lower than the average for EU-24. Exports to Italy grew in value at only 1.9 per cent per year (meaning that in real after-inflation terms, they almost certainly declined). British exports probably grew in real terms to Germany, though not by much. Outside the EU, British exports grew at a healthy pace (Table 2) to wealthy developed nations like the USA, Australia and Singapore (Canada and Japan being notable exceptions). They also grew at a good pace to developing nations like Russia, Turkey, China/Hong Kong, the Gulf Sheikdoms and South Africa. Successive British governments have justified our embroilment with the EU primarily on the unfounded assertion that "60 per cent of our trade's with the EU". Now that 60 per cent of our trade is **not** with the EU - even with the addi-

move on."

tion of the ten new countries in 2004 – and now that the proportion of our trade going outside the EU is increasing, the economic *raison d'être* of UK membership of the EU is, to borrow a current expression, "not fit for purpose". As another phrase from the New Labour lexicon has it: "It's time to

move on."

is **not** with the EU - even with the addi-

Table 3
Growth¹ of UK Exports² to Selected EU Countries, 1999 -2005

Country/Region	Rate of Growth %
Ireland	10.7
Spain	8.5
Netherlands	5.3
Belgium	5.1
France	4.8
Denmark	4.3
Sweden	4.0
Germany	3.8
Italy	1.9

1: Annual average compounded

2: Exports: value at current prices of Goods, Services, Income and Transfers

Source: Table 9.2, page 125, UK Balance of Payments, The Pink Book 2006

United Kingdom Balance of Payments: The Pink Book 2006: Office for National Statistics, July 2006. Free download: www.statistics.gov.uk Browse by Theme > Select Theme > Economy > Go > More detailed topics for Economy > Balance of Payments > United Kingdom Balance of Payments: The Pink Book > Pink Book 2006

*For a discussion of the adjustments to the 2002 official

data, see Appendix IV and Appendix V of A Cost Too Far?, by Ian Milne, Civitas 2004, www.civitas.org.uk. See also Global Britain Briefing Notes Nos 32 and 22, www.globalbritain.org

A Cost Too Far available price £5 from www.junepress.com

More UK Jobs Dependent on Trade Outside the EU than with the EU?

On present trends, with British exports of goods and services to countries outside the EU growing over 40 per cent faster than British exports to the EU (even according to the official UK statistics, which overstate UK exports to the EU because of the Rotterdam-Antwerp Effect and the separate Netherlands Distortion) there will soon – within the next two years – be more exports to non-EU countries than to EU countries. At that point, according to the

logic of the Government's repeated assertion that the UK belongs to the EU because "3 million jobs depend on trade with the EU", more UK jobs will be dependent on trade with non-EU countries than with EU countries. It follows, does it not, that the Government should then apply for "membership" of the World outside the EU?

When the definition of "trade" is widened to include - as it should -

"income" and "transfers", the fact is that well over the half of UK exports - around 60 per cent of the worldwide total - **already** go outside the EU*. That may be the reason mainstream British politicians are so reluctant to acknowledge the major contribution that the industries (for example the City) generating that "income" make to British prosperity.

* See "EU Takes a Declining Share of UK Exports" on page 4 and above.

LETTERS

Tel: 08456 12 12 65 Fax: 08456 12 12 75 email: eurofacts@junepress.com

Immigration Issues

Dear Sir,

While I side with Anthony Scholefield's position on the immigration issue, his adversary, Lionel Bell (letters, 8th September), makes a valid point that opposing immigration as a means to uphold wages beyond the 'market' level is wrong. I paraphrase this as there being a distortion of the (labour) market. But Mr Bell (as often with those taking a 'radical' position fails to see the other side of the coin.

He fails to point out that for those presently in low paid work there is just such a distortion in existence - known as the 'minimum wage' - such that cushy jobs are rewarded by wages over the odds, making unappealing jobs even less attractive at the (minimum) rate being offered. Could it be that this is at the root of the low uptake of the poorly paid work problem?

And for those out of work there is another called 'Social Security'.

If we dispensed with these policies, Mr Bell's case would be relevant, but then if we did, due to market forces, the jobs would get done at the wages on offer - the Iron Law of Wages - and the case for immigration on economic grounds would not get a look in. So philosophically, Mr Bell's criticism should be levelled at the Welfare State not at an Immigration Restriction Policy.

As it stands, we either pay more for our products because of the excessive a) wage content or b) tax content (to cover the unemployment costs). Someone out of work creates nothing; someone overpaid creates something but inefficiently. While this remains the choice to be made, the higher wage content is preferable both economically and socially.

Free marketeers make the more acceptable case as put by Mr Bell but the CBI members go one stage further. Their case is that immigrant workers offer more bang for the buck than the indigenous workforce. This too is a distortion of the labour market so inimical to free marketeers. Does Mr

Bell criticise this?

JOHN S CHURCHILL
Gloucestershire

What Veto?

Dear Sir,

When we joined the EEC we were assured that nothing could ever be forced upon us, because we would always have a veto. To quote the official government pamphlet for the 1975 referendum: "The Minister representing Britain can veto any proposal for a new law or a new tax if he considers it to be against British interests".

Since then, however, there has been a shift away from the requirement for unanimity, so that more and more decisions are taken by majority voting.

Now the EU proposes to remove the veto on criminal justice matters, which were not even included in the original treaty. Our elected Parliament could then be obliged to change our criminal law solely to comply with the wishes of other EU governments.

There has been little publicity about this plan, but the next occasion when it will be discussed is very soon, on September 22nd, and there is a real possibility that Home Secretary Dr John Reid will then agree to relinquish our veto.

It is no use waiting until the consequences feed through before complaining. Now is the time for us to protest to our MPs that Dr Reid should not surrender our veto, and if he does then Parliament should take the earliest opportunity to repudiate his decision.

Dr D.R. COOPER
Berkshire

Congratulations

Dear Sir,

I hope your readers will join with me and many others to applaud the position taken by the ASDA supermarket, over its condemnation of the Common Fisheries Policy, and its wish to give control of fishing back to the fishermen.

What a pity our elected members of

the UK Parliament are unable to do anything about the CFP or any other EU folly.

SIMON RITCHIE
Hampshire

What Future?

Dear Sir,

What your issue of the 8th September illustrates - on trade, immigration, CAP, British money draining to Brussels, etc - is the ineptitude of ALL major political parties, including the Tories, who seem intent on copying Blairite New Labour,

It is difficult to imagine how Britain can get itself out of the trap it is in without something earth-shattering happening. Am I right?

Therefore, it is not surprising that about 40 per cent of the British electorate turn their backs on national elections and some 60 per cent do likewise at local polls.

Is this unprecedented in British political history? If so, do we have no guide to indicate what might happen if disillusion turns to despair, as it might if the global economy turns down?

RALPH MADDERN
Warwickshire

Aid Money

Dear Sir,

Why is it that so much so-called "Aid" money is channelled through the EU?

We are repeatedly told that the EU gives large sums of money to disasters and donations of "Aid".

What we are never told is the percentage of that money which is actually paid for by British taxpayers'.

The EU unlike real businesses is unable to balance its books and account for all the money that it processes. Surely, the time has come to remove the EU element from "Aid" and only make payments directly from individual countries, that way we would all know how much and where our taxpayers' money really goes.

RICHARD DONOLLY
Ireland

MEETINGS

Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign
01224 313473

Monday **25th September**, 5.45 pm

“The European Union - What Next?”

Tony Benn
Dr Brian Burkitt
Kelvin Hopkins MP

LABOUR PARTY FRINGE MEETING
Charters Suite, Arora Hotel, Princess
Street, Manchester
Admission Free

Gresham College
020 7831 0575

Tuesday **26th September**, 6.00 pm

“The Civil Service and the Constitution”

Professor Vernon Bogdanor CBE
FBA, *Gresham Professor of Law*

PUBLIC MEETING
Barnard's Inn Hall, Holburn, London
Admission Free

London Swinton Circle

Tuesday **26th September**, 7.00 pm

“The EU as experienced: From moderate support to outright opposition”

Edward Spalton, *Former senior civil servant and businessman*

PUBLIC MEETING
Whitehall Clarence, 53 Whitehall,
London SW1
Admission Free

Democracy Movement
01424 848964

Thursday **28th September**, 7.30 pm

Christopher Heaton-Harris MEP,
Conservative
Mark Wallace, *Freedom Association*,
Campaign Manager

PUBLIC MEETING
The High Beech Hotel, Eisenhower
Drive, Battle Road, St Leonards-on-Sea,
East Sussex
Admission Free

Conservative Party Fringe Meetings Bournemouth

Open Europe
0207 197 2333

Tuesday **3rd October**, 12.30 pm

“Can the EU be reformed? If so how?”

Speakers include;
Graham Brady MP, *Shadow Minister*
for Europe

Anthony Browne, *Brussels Correspondent*, *The Times*, 2003-2006

David Heathcoat-Amory MP, *Member*
of the European Convention
Chairman, **Charles Moore**, *former*
Editor, *Daily Telegraph*

PUBLIC MEETING
Dorchester Two, Marriott Highcliff,
Bournemouth
Admission Free

Freedom Association
01746 861267

Tuesday **3rd October**, 1.00 pm

“Better Off Out Campaign”

Philip Davies MP
Daniel Hannan MEP
Roger Helmer MEP
Laura Midgley, *Campaign Against*
Political Correctness
Chairman, **Mark Wallace**, *Campaign*
Manager, *Better Off Out*

PUBLIC MEETING
De Vere Suite, De Vere Royal Hotel,
Bath Road, Bournemouth
Admission Free

Save Britain's Fish
01224 313473

Tuesday **3rd October**, 6.30 pm

“Why sink the fishing policy?”

John Ashworth, *Save Britain's Fish*

PUBLIC MEETING
The Cliffeside Hotel, East Overcliffe
Drive, Bournemouth
Admission Free

Australian Monarchist League
00 61 (02) 9327 4582

Friday - Sunday **27 - 29th October**

“The Queen, the Realms and Europe”

Speakers to be announced

The Rt Hon Lord Tebbit CH to address
the Dinner on Friday 27th October

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Double Bay, NSW 1360 or by Email:
secretary@monarchist.org.au

United Kingdom
Independence Party
0151 426 1784

Friday **10th November**, 7.00 pm

Speakers to include;
Godfrey Bloom MEP, *UKIP*

NORTH WEST RALLY
Tower College, Rainhill, Merseyside
Admission Free

DIARY OF EVENTS

2006

Labour Party **24-28th September**
Annual Conference
Manchester

Conservative Party **1-4th October**
Annual Conference
Bournemouth

UK Independence Party **7-8th October**
Annual Conference
Telford

UK Parliamentary **9th October**
Recess Ends

2007

Germany takes over **1st January**
EU presidency

The European Question and the National Interest

by *Jeremy Black*. **£16.99**

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The Great Deception:

Can the European Union survive

by *Christopher Booker*. **£9.99**

This is the latest version (Nov 2005) of this comprehensive history of the EU.

The Truth They Won't Tell You (And Don't Want You To Know)

About the EU

by *Vernon Coleman*. **£9.99**

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Britain and the EU: Time to Move On

by *Christopher Hoskin*. **£3.95**

The EU malaise and the cure.

The Future is a Foreign Country

by *Matthew Illsley*. **£10.00**

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The EU and the death of Local Government by *Lindsay Jenkins*. **£14.99**

The detailed Brussels agenda for the break-up of the United Kingdom.

Resolving the European Crisis

Perspectives on the future of the EU.

Edited by *Paul Jervis*. **£9.99**

Authors include; Daniel Hannan MEP, Ruth Lea, Lord Pearson, John Redwood MP and Gisela Stuart MP.

The Missing Heart of Europe

Does Britain hold the key to the future of the Continent?

by *Thomas Kremer*. **£11.99**

Can nation states flourish? A European businessman's view of the impact of divergent national cultures.

The 2006 Essential Guide to the European Union

by *Ruth Lea*. **£15.00**

A detailed yet accessible analysis of how the EU works now and in the future.

The Referendum Roundabout

by *Kieron O'Hara*. **£8.95**

A lively and sharp critique of the role of referendums in modern British politics, includes the 1975 vote on Europe, devolution, and a possible Constitution.

EU: Papacy Reincarnated?

by *Mark Stout*. **£9.99**

This book explores the origins and functioning of both the EU and the Medieval Papacy from a legal/political/historical perspective and unearths a startling number of parallels.

Corruption - The World's Big C

Cases, Causes, Consequences, Cures

by *Ian Senior*. **£12.50**

Senior shows how corruption in the EU is becoming worse and why the UK should not sign up to the proposed European Constitution.

The Benefits of Tax Competition

by *Richard Teather*. **£12.50**

Teather argues that EU attempts to harmonise taxes will damage the world economy.

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ISSN 1361-4134



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